G. E. M. Anscombe (—) of psychology. Her work on action, found mostly in her short book Intention, was a step in the direction of such a philosophy. Philosophical perplexity about intention begins with its appearance in three guises: intention for the future, as when I intend to complete this. Anscombe’s Intention () is one of the classics of 20th century .. Philosophy and Ethics by G.E.M. Anscombe (St. Andrews Studies in.
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It was no good pointing to difficulties about it, things which Russell found wrong with it, for example. Along with such matters of detail, two problems of principle can be raised against the present approach. She does not fully explain why she thinks this to be the case, but people have wondered whether the concern is, or should be, with the best happiness or the most, and of living people or all living sentient creatures or all future sentient creatures or what, and how one might measure happiness at all.
CC, Her claim g.e.m.anscobe that the further intentions that accompany these actions are the same, but that the kind of intentional act one is performing in each case differs in a very significant way. University of Minnesota Press, But a mere conjunction seems insufficient: There is an action that the agent performs which has two effects, one good, intejtion bad. If intention is a mental state in relation to which doing A amounts to doing A intentionally, or with the further intention of doing Bthat fact would unify the modes of intention with which we began.
Page 1 of 1 Start over Page 1 of 1. Indeed, it continues to be a standard point of reference for those working in action theory and philosophical psychology.
Thus if A is the fact that I have paid for something, the brute facts might be that I have handed him a cheque for a sum which he has named as the price for the goods, saying that this is the payment, or that I gave him some cash at the time that he gave me the goods. Amazon Advertising Find, attract, and engage customers.
Rather, the point is to bring about a state of affairs in the world. By the way, the whole argument does not appear to be specific to practical reason: Catholicism portal Philosophy portal. In Crisp, Roger ; Slote, Michael. But if I try to do so behind my back, under anesthesia, I may not believe that I am clenching my fist, even though—on the face of it—I am doing so intentionally, and that is just what I intend Setiyapp.
G. E. M. Anscombe
There is also disagreement about intemtion kind of explanation involved in giving the reasons for which one acts WilsonCh. Whichever way we go, we will need to motivate the evaluative theory. Non avevo la minima voglia di tornar a studiare ‘sta roba. Feb 11, Joana rated it really liked it. David Velleman, University of Michigan Intention is a classic of modern philosophical psychology.
The perversion of the sex act in marriage is, in this one way, like writing a forged check for a good cause, she claims.
Neither option is appealing. When a set of facts xyz stands in this relation to a fact A, they are a subset out of a range some subset among which holds if A holds.
Yet this leads to a philosophical puzzle: Assume for the sake of argument there is no God, and religiously based moral theory is incorrect. Even here, however, an intention is executed: Aside from the profound problem of commending vicious acts, Anscombe also believed that consequentialism failed to capture, indeed, must fail to capture, crucial elements of moral psychology.
The explosion would then be caused but not in a way that could, even in principle, be predicted. But she also notes that not all appetites desires, needs, wants are equal and that part of the moral game involves assessing and commending or discommending some appetites over others. The Harvester Press, Indeed, Anscombe writes that we ought not to try to drop such talk.
But if the picture is basically right, it suggests that the unity of intention can be found in knowledge or belief about action.
Intention (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Acknowledgments I would like to thank an editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for his or her extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. The principal challenge for a cognitivist account of means-end coherence is to explain why one must avoid such theoretical failures gg.e.m.anscombe forming the relevant intention, not just the corresponding belief Bratman a.
If every bit of human behavior were determined by causal laws, then it might seem that the difference between intended and unintended results of action could not possibly matter. This was intentional, an act of suicide. Yet the examples are salient and useful as she unravels the way in which our concept of intention informs our treatment of different kinds of actions and what kind of thing intentions are.